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ABSTRACT 
  This study analyzes the evolution of competitive conditions in the Banking industries of 
fourteen  Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition economies using firm-level data. The 
results of the competition analysis suggest that the banking markets of CEE countries cannot be 
characterized by the bipolar cases of either perfect competition or monopoly over 1993-2000 
except for FYR of Macedonia and Slovakia.  That is, banks earned their revenues as if operating 
under conditions of monopolistic competition in that period. Furthermore, the cross-sectional 
analysis of competitive structure reveals initially a decreasing trend between 1993 and 1996 and a 
subsequent increasing trend in competitive conditions after 1996. Large banks in transition 
countries operate in a relatively more competitive environment compared to small banks, or in 
other words, competition is lower in local markets compared to national and international 
markets.   
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COMPETITION AND CONTESTABILITY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPEAN BANKING MARKETS  
 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have gone through significant 
economic and political transformations during the last decade. As they moved away from 
state control to a relatively free-market system, these countries launched wide-ranging 
economic and financial reform programs to stabilize their economies and to establish 
market forces as performance drivers.
1  Throughout the transition, strengthening and 
restructuring of the financial sectors, as well as improving the supervision and regulation 
of banking and financial services, received a strong emphasis to cope with market forces 
and sustain economic stability and growth.  Privatization of state-owned banks and 
elimination of the restrictions on domestic and foreign market entries increased the 
number of commercial banks operating in their highly concentrated and inefficient 
national markets, and changed the competitive conditions in banking profoundly.  
The initial efforts of transformation to market economies were reinforced later on 
by the goal of membership in the European Union (EU). As the process of achieving full 
integration among its member countries was evolving, the EU initiated an eastward 
enlargement plan through the inclusion of former socialist countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe into the union.  Such developments are expected to have a substantial 
influence on the financial and banking systems of CEE countries, with increasingly 
tighter links to the EU. Even before this phase, widespread deregulation and 
liberalization, accompanied by technological development and internationalization have 
significantly changed the competitive structure of European financial services industry. 
                                                 
1 See Scholtens (2000) for a survey of the efforts for developing financial systems in CEE countries during 
the early transition years (1990-1996).   3
These new competitive conditions are likely to entice large European financial 
institutions that are currently operating at relatively low margins to extend their cross-
border operations into the potentially more profitable markets of CEE countries.  
Based on the above discussion, we wish to review the effects of recent changes in 
the competitive structure of the CEE banking markets and to measure the current level of 
market contestability that may have been facilitated by the recent liberalization and 
deregulation progress.
2 Specifically, we would like to know whether the recent legal and 
institutional reforms were sufficient to transform the market structure into a more 
competitive mode or whether there are still some serious obstacles inherited from the 
earlier system that prevent the realization of competition.  
The results of this study will likely have important policy implications since the 
research focuses on the essential structural and regulatory aspects of banking which 
enable CEE countries to promote financial stability during the transition period and to 
create an efficient financial infrastructure centered on future accession to the EU. Since 
their money and capital markets are still in infancy, the transition countries have 
primarily bank-based financial systems; banks intermediate large portions of capital 
flows and household savings, and constitute the primary source of business financing. 
These conditions imply that a potential break-down in their banking systems can yield 
contagion effects to all other sectors of their economies.  Indeed, these transformation 
challenges, give rise to some of the following policy questions: As they open their 
economies to a greater influence from the western world, how should they manage the 
transition process by avoiding financial distress and adjust successfully to the expected 
                                                 
2 Although the central focus of the paper is not to evaluate the effects of liberalization and restructuring 
directly, we do try to measure their possible effects on banking sector contestability in section 4.2.1 where 
the overall sample is decomposed into sub-periods 1993-96 and 1997-2000;   4
new competitive environment? How should they design and implement the competitive 
policies, and appropriate supervisory and regulatory framework?  Should they enforce 
market discipline by promoting foreign competition or adapt defensive policies to protect 
the infant banking industry from competition?  These are some of the important policy 
directions addressed by CEE countries for the successful development of stable, efficient, 
properly supervised financial systems for both the transitional economic reforms and 
their preparations for accession to the EU.  
The aforementioned policy perspectives, as well as increasing interest in this topic 
among academics and practitioners alike, motivate our examination of competition and 
contestability in the CEE transition economies. Given the challenges that the CEE 
countries face, the empirical results of this study should be timely and helpful for 
policymakers to better understand how their decisions affect both market conduct and the 
performance of financial institutions under their supervision. In the present study, we 
employ the theory and some concepts of the new industrial organization literature for 
analyzing and measuring the banking competition in fourteen European transition 
economies. To the best of our knowledge, there are no prior comprehensive empirical 
analyses of changing competitive conditions in the CEE banking industry published in 
academic journals.
3 Hence, this study tries to fill this gap and extend previous studies on 
bank competition to the CEE banking markets using the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic  (Panzar 
and Rosse, 1987).  
                                                 
3 One of the reviewers correctly has pointed out that several related papers have been presented and widely 
discussed in congresses, symposia, and seminars, but “have not yet appeared in academic journals.”  Since 
we have had no direct access to these related studies and cannot evaluate their contributions, we wish to 
acknowledge them here as works-in-progress.  Thus, we shall make direct references only to peer-reviewed 
research that has been published in academic journals.  Nonetheless, we acknowledge and appreciate the 
information content in the reviewer’s comment.   5
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 1 sets the stage for our 
analysis by reviewing briefly the recent history of banking reforms in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Section 2 summarizes the previous studies and methods employed to test 
competition in the banking literature. Section 3 presents our model, the testable 
hypotheses, and the data used to assess competitive conduct in CEE banking markets. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, section 5 presents the conclusions and 
outlines suggestions for future research. 
 
1. Banking in Central and Eastern Europe 
Until the social and economic transformation reforms in late 1980s, a socialist 
banking system was in effect in CEE countries. At the center of this structure was a 
monobank that performed the simultaneous roles of central bank and commercial bank. 
The monobank was in charge of issuing currency, managing the payments system among 
enterprises, providing savings deposit facilities to households, making loans to 
enterprises and covering the deficits of the State budget. These monobanks, however, had 
neither expertise nor control over the process of assessing and managing risk and return, 
and/or the granting of loans, since lending decisions were then made centrally by the 
state, which typically allocated funds based on political priorities rather than efficiency 
and profitability considerations.    
The restructuring of the banking system in CEE economies started in the late 
1980s after the collapse of their Communist regimes. Hungary and Poland took the lead 
in establishing independent central banks, followed by the three Baltic States (Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania) and the Czech and Slovak Republics. The monobank system was   6
transformed into a two-tier banking system by breaking up the monobank into a central 
bank and a number of commercial banks in each country by new regulatory frameworks.
4 
New commercial banks were allowed to engage in a wide range of banking activities, 
usually specializing in sectors, with increased roles in management and credit allocation. 
However, these artificially established banks inherited many problems from central 
planning that plagued the banking system: capital inadequacy, non-performing loans to 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), non-diversified loan portfolios and clientele, 
inexperienced management and personnel, underdeveloped branch networks, and other 
related problems.  
  During the initial transition, restrictions on the establishment of new banks were 
relaxed and some governments also encouraged the establishment of new banks as a way 
of enhancing competition. This period was characterized by a growing number of 
commercial banks and efforts to strengthen the two-tier system. Governments accelerated 
the restructuring efforts with the introduction of schemes for revamping their banking 
systems.
5 While restructuring their banking systems, many of these CEE countries 
experienced severe banking crises due both to corporate distress and the absence of 
effective regulatory and legal structures.
6 The lack of effective corporate governance and 
payments discipline exacerbated the problems. The bank administrators and managerial 
personnel lacked the knowledge and experience of banking procedures, as well as the 
technology practiced in market economies; additionally the customers were not 
                                                 
4 Some of the assets of the Monobank were transferred to newly established commercial banks without 
cleansing the non-performing loans and many of these banks were technically insolvent from the date of 
their establishment.  
5 For example, Hungary has adopted the Anglo-Saxon model of separation between the commercial and 
investment banking functions, while the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania have followed the 
German-Japanese models of universal banking  (Thorne 1993) . 
6 Space limitations prevent us here from dwelling on the details and dates of these crises for each of the 
countries.  For more details, the reader is referred to (Caprio and Klingebiel, 2002).   7
accustomed to the new banking practices. Thus, the banking sectors did not have 
sufficient flexibility to operate adequately or competitively in a market economy. 
Commercial banks experienced dramatic deteriorations on their balance sheets due to 
substantial amounts of non-performing assets, capital inadequacy, and currency 
devaluations.  However, after enacting and implementing the new prudential regulations 
to stabilize the banking system, and bailing out of bad loans by governments, banks 
experienced significant balance sheet restructuring and improvements in asset quality.
7 
Despite the problems experienced in the early years of transition, the CEE 
governments appeared determined to develop competitive and efficient financial systems 
based on market forces for the conversion from central planning to market economies and 
for fulfilling the obligations for future EU integration. CEE governments initiated large-
scale privatization programs that substantially diminished the state ownership in banking 
during the mid-1990s. The main motive behind privatization of state-owned banks was 
the desire to enhance competition and efficiency in the banking sector through increased 
foreign and domestic participation.  Banking crises that affected the region during this 
period have basically accelerated the privatization process and thus, foreign participation. 
By the end of the decade, the average share of foreign ownership in terms of both total 
assets and capital exceeded 60 percent. Despite the large-scale privatization and more 
                                                 
7 According to various asset quality proxies in 1999, except for the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, banking 
sectors in CEE countries seem to have attained a viable level of asset quality.  But we should note that these 
asset quality ratios are not quite comparable to those in Western European countries where a ratio of non-
performing loans to gross loans of more than 5% is considered as a serious problem for a given bank.     8
liberal public policy towards the elimination of entry barriers, however, the banking 
sector remained highly concentrated throughout the sample period.
8   
  During the course of transition, the CEE countries have shown significant 
progress in integrating with the developed economies of the EU. Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, 
and Slovenia are negotiating their potential accession to the EU. In order to strengthen 
their financial systems they are trying to increase the transparency of their economic 




2.  Theory and Literature Review  
2.1.  Major Approaches to Competitive Behavior 
In the literature, two “structural” approaches for assessing competition are the 
“Structure-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis” (SCP) and the “Efficient Structure 
Hypothesis” (ESH). The SCP hypothesis attempts to infer the degree of competition in an 
industry from its structural features (Bain, 1951). Basically, the SCP implies that 
concentration in the banking industry can generate market power, allowing banks to earn 
                                                 
8For example, the 3-Bank concentration ratio (CR3) in our pooled sample went down from 80.5 % in 1993 
to 59% in 1997, and subsequently rose to 65% in 1999 for the region. Nevertheless, the largest three banks 
in Estonia, Lithuania, and Yugoslavia held more than 90% of the assets in the banking industry in 1999. 
Over the sample period, on average, Russia had the lowest CR3 ratio of about 49%, followed by Poland 
and Hungary with CR3 ratio of about 52 %.    9
monopolistic profits by offering lower deposit rates and charging higher loan rates.
9 The 
policy implication of these findings is that governments should monitor keenly bank 
mergers and acquisitions and enforce strictly antitrust policies. ESH, on the other hand, 
suggests that the positive relationship profitability and market concentration is not a 
consequence of market power but of the greater efficiency of firms with larger market 
share (Demsetz, 1973). In other words, the superior performance of the market leaders 
(due to firm specific factors such as technological or managerial skills) endogenously 
determines the market structure, implying that higher efficiency produces both higher 
concentration and greater profitability.  Based on these arguments bank efficiency serves 
as the leading force in market concentration.  
"Non-structural models" do not infer the competitive conduct of banks through 
the analysis of market structure, but rather recognize that banks behave differently 
depending on the market structure in which they operate. Under this framework, the 
“Contestable Markets Theory” (CMT), first developed by Baumol (1982), stresses that a 
concentrated industry can behave competitively if the barriers for new entrants to the 
market are nonexistent or low.  CMT assumes that firms can enter or leave rapidly any 
market without losing their capital and that potential competitors have the same cost 
function as incumbent firms. Baumol emphasizes that incumbent firms are always 
vulnerable to hit-and-run entry when they try to exercise their potential market power. 
These features of contestable markets imply that a concentrated banking market can be 
effectively competitive even if it is dominated by a handful of large banks.  Therefore, 
policymakers should be relatively less concerned about the market dominance of some 
                                                 
9 Proponents of this view use the frequently observed positive statistical relationship between banking 
market concentration and bank profitability to justify their arguments.   10
types of financial intermediaries in a country’s financial system, if the financial markets 
are contestable. Based on these arguments, deregulation and liberalization will likely 
make the banking industry more contestable or open to competition.  In order to test for 
contestability, previous research has employed the competition model proposed by 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) or the so-called “H statistic”.   
2.2. Panzar-Rosse (PR) Methodology and Empirical Literature 
The PR approach relies on the premise that banks will employ different pricing 
strategies in response to changes in input costs depending on the market structure in 
which they operate. Hence, whether a bank operates in a competitive market or exercises 
some monopoly power can be inferred from an analysis of that bank’s revenue as it 
responds to changing input prices.  In order to measure the competitive structure of the 
industry, PR established a so-called "H statistic"; this is estimated as the sum of the 
elasticities of the reduced form (equilibrium) revenues with respect to input prices. More 
specifically, the H statistic measures the percentage change in a bank's equilibrium 
revenues caused by one percent change in all of the bank's input prices.
10  
The economic interpretation of the H statistic is as follows. If the market in which 
banks operate is characterized as monopoly then H statistic is less than or equal to zero. 
This is due to the economic intuition that a monopolist's revenue will respond in the 
opposite direction to a change in input prices, as a one percent increase in input prices 
leads to a one percent increase in marginal costs, thus reducing equilibrium output and 
                                                 
10 The details of formal derivation of H statistic can be found in Panzar and Rosse (1987) and Vesala (1995).   11
revenue. PR further show that the H statistic is also negative when the structure is a 
conjectural variations short-run oligopoly.  
The H statistic is equal to one when the market structure is characterized as perfectly 
competitive; under this condition, a proportional shift in all input prices will increase both 
marginal and average costs by the same proportion, without changing the equilibrium 
output of banks. In order to survive the competition, banks will be forced to increase 
prices until they cover the increased costs. During this adjustment process, the inefficient 
banks might be acquired by efficient ones or be eventually driven out of the market by 
competition. The reduction in the number of banks in the industry will increase the 
demand faced by each incumbent bank, thereby leading to a rise in the output price and 
revenue by the same amount as costs.  Shaffer (1982) shows that the H statistic is also 
unity for a natural monopoly operating in a perfectly contestable market and also for a 
sales-maximizing firm that is subject to breakeven constraints.  
As the third case, PR distinguish the situation of monopolistic competition, in 
which, although banks behave like monopolists, the market entry or exit of other banks 
with imperfect rival products makes them always generate precisely zero profits. In this 
case the H statistic will lie between zero and unity, as revenues will increase less than 
proportionally to changes in input prices. Since H statistic is a decreasing function of the 
perceived demand elasticity, in the literature, a higher H statistic is sometimes interpreted 
as an indicator of a higher degree of competitiveness.  Different interpretations of the H-
statistic, which are discussed in Shaffer (1982,1983), Nathan and Neave (1989), and 
Molyneux et al. (1994), are summarized in Table 1.    12
An important advantage of PR model is that, it does not require output price and 
quantity data, which are not readily available most of the time or which are costly to 
obtain. Since reduced-form revenue equations can be estimated without estimating the 
structural equations, the data availability issue (especially for the supply side) becomes 
less of a concern.  Furthermore the need for correcting for the quality disappears since 
output prices are not involved. Another benefit of the model is that it can incorporate 
bank-specific factors in the production function by using firm-level data. It also allows to 
examine the differences among banks arising from type (e.g. commercial vs. savings), 
size (large vs. small), ownership (domestic vs. foreign, or state vs. private) etc.  Applying 
the PR method to banking requires treating banks as single-product firms that produce 
loans and other earning assets using deposits and other funding as input variables in the 
production function. This approach also assumes that (except for the monopoly case) the 
test is undertaken on observations that are in long-run equilibrium, and that banks are 
profit maximizing firms with conventional demand and cost structures.   
Table 2 summarizes the previous studies that have examined the competitive structure 
of the banking industry in various countries by using H-statistic. Shaffer (1982) applied 
the PR methodology to a cross-section of banking firms in New York in 1979, and found 
that competitive conduct of banks cannot be characterized as monopolistic or perfectly 
competitive in the long run. Similarly, Nathan and Neave (1989) also rejected the 
hypothesis of monopoly and perfect competition for Canadian banks, trust companies and 
mortgage companies over the period 1983-1984. Molyneux et al. (1994) used the same 
analysis in a sample of German, UK, French, Italian, and Spanish banks for each year of 
the period 1986 to 1989. On average, their results suggest monopolistic competition in   13
Germany, France, Spain and the UK, and monopoly in Italy. Vesala (1995) applied a 
similar model to the Finnish banking industry and found monopolistic competition for 
1985-88 and 1991-92, and perfect competition for 1989-90. Molyneux et al. (1996) 
examined the competitive conduct of Japanese commercial banks and found monopoly 
for 1986 and monopolistic competition for 1988. Coccorese (1998) and Hondroyiannis et 
al. (1999) found monopolistic competition for Italian and Greek banking sectors. In a 
more recent study, De Bandt and Davis (2000) reported monopolistic competition for 
large banks and monopoly for small banks for Germany and France, and monopolistic 
competition for small and large banks in Italy over the period 1992-1996. Bikker and 
Groeneveld (2000) found monopolistic competition of varying degrees for EU countries 
for the period of 1989 to 1996. Finally, in a more comprehensive study, Bikker and Haaf 
(2002) examined competitive conduct of banks in 23 developed countries over the time 
period 1988-1999.  They reported that, in general, the banking markets of industrialized 
countries could be characterized by monopolistic competition. However, they could not 
reject the case of monopoly for the samples of small banks in Australia and Greece, and 
perfect competition for large banks in several countries.  
 
3.  Empirical Model, Testable Hypotheses and Database   
3.1. Empirical Model  
We are interested in evaluating the effects of recent changes in competitive 
structure of the CEE banking industry and in showing how close is such banking industry 
to the state of high competition envisioned by recent legal and institutional reforms. We   14
should, however, note that, although banks can somehow differentiate themselves 
through specialization in certain areas and through the provision of new services, the PR 
approach can not capture the degree of competition in each division of banking markets 
separately; it is basically a means of estimating the overall competitive conduct in a given 
banking system. In order to apply the PR methodology to the banking industry we follow 
the previous studies and adopt the "intermediation approach" to bank modeling where the 
financial intermediation role of a bank is emphasized.
11  It also reflects the realities of 
banking in the CEE countries, as they attempt to cross the threshold to modern banking.  
We estimate the following bank revenue equation in which revenue is explained 
by factor prices and other bank-specific variables that affect long-run equilibrium bank 
revenues for CEE countries for the years 1993 through 2000.  
ln (REVit) = h1 ln(PFit) + h2 ln(PLit) + h3 ln(PKit)  + β1 ln(TAit)  + β2  ln(EQTYit)  





α + εit    (1)   
for t=1,…..,T where T is the number of periods observed, and i=1,….. ,I, where I is the 
total number of banks and ln is the natural logarithm.  The dependent variable (REV) is 
the ratio of total interest revenue (or total revenue) to total assets. The model posits that 
banks use three input factors- namely, deposits, labor, and physical capital. Variables PF, 
PL and PK are the unit prices of these inputs or reasonable proxies: (PF) the ratio of 
                                                 
11 Two empirical approaches to modeling bank output are the "intermediation" and the "production" 
approaches. The intermediation approach treats banks as financial intermediaries that create output only in 
terms of their assets, using their liabilities, labor and capital. Deposits are treated as inputs that are 
intermediated into banks’ outputs (loans and investments) and interest on deposits is a component of total 
cost, together with labor and capital costs.  The production approach, views banks as firms that use capital 
and labor to produce loans and deposits.  Since deposits are considered as output, the interest expense on 
deposits is not included in the costs. For further discussion of these approaches, see Berger et al. (1987)    15
interest expenses to deposits and other liabilities, (PL) the ratio of personnel expenses to 
total assets, and (PK) the ratio of non-interest expenses to fixed assets.
12  A number of 
control variables, included to account for size, risk, and deposit mix differences, are 
similar to those used in previous studies. These factors are total assets (TA), financial 
capital (EQTY), net loans (LOAN), and interbank deposits (IBDP). To take the country-
specific characteristics into account, country dummy variables were also added in the 
pooled sample estimations.  
The 3-input factor model with total interest revenue (INTREV) as the dependent 
variable will be referred to as Model (1a) and the model with total revenue (TOTREV) as 
the dependent variable will be referred to as Model (1b). The definitions of the dependent 
and explanatory variables for the model as well as their descriptive statistics for the 
overall sample are presented in Table 3. Under the PR framework, the H statistic is equal 
to the sum of the elasticities of the revenue with respect to the three input prices: 
 H =  h1 + h2 + h3            ( 2 )    
For almost all the banks in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and for several banks in other 
CEE countries, BankScope data do not provide personnel expense figures as a separate 
cost item. To rectify this problem and also for robustness check a second model is 
specified, as shown in Equation (3), where the sum of personnel expense and capital 
expense variables are combined into the total overhead expense variable.  
                                                 
12 Ideally, the ratio of personnel expense to the number of full time employees would be a better proxy for 
labor cost. Due to the unavailability of data on the number of employees we cannot employ the ratio of 
personnel expenses to number of workers as unit price for labor. Using the ratio of personnel expense to total 
assets as labor cost is a common approach in studies that employ BankScope data. [Molyneux et al. (1994), 
Bikker and Groeneveld (1999), De Bandt and Davis (2000)].     16
ln (REVit) = h1 ln(PFit) + h2 ln(POit) + β1 ln(TAit)  + β2  ln(EQTYit)  





α + εit    (3)   
where  PO is the ratio of overhead expenses to total assets and the other variables are the 
same as those in Equation (1).  This 2-input factor model with total interest revenue 
(INTREV) as the dependent variable will be referred to as Model (2a) and the model with 
total revenue (TOTREV) as the dependent variable will be referred to as Model (2b). The 
H-statistic by Model 2 is thus given by the sum of the two input elasticities:
13  
H = h1 + h2           ( 4 )  
The conventional wisdom about the banking market structure of CEE countries is 
that several large, old banks dominate the markets and the degree of concentration is 
relatively high. Monopolistic competition is a priori the most plausible structure for the 
banking industry since it recognizes that banks can differentiate themselves through 
specialization, service quality, and advertising although their business is fairly 
homogenous. The testable hypothesis for monopolistic competition is: 
0 < H=h1 + h2 + h3  <   1 ,           ( 5 )    
where H ≤ 0 is monopoly and H=1 is perfect competition.   
The regression models are first estimated by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method 
on the pooled sample of banks and years, implicitly assuming that standard errors are 
independently distributed across banks and over time.  One advantage of having panel data is 
                                                 
13 This new specification helped us to recoup a substantial amount of observations lost due to the 
unavailability of complete data for the personnel expense variable in two countries.     17
that it allows controlling for heterogeneity bias, or the confounding effects of omitted 
variables that are stable over time. Considering the time-series dimension of the data, we also 
used fixed-effects estimators, correcting for the effect of any combination of time-invariant 
variables that have been omitted, knowingly or not, from the regression model. This 
estimation entails specifying a different intercept term for each bank in the sample as well as 
time dummies for each year. The fixed-effects model with total interest revenue (INTREV) 
as the dependent variable will be referred to as Model Fixed-1 and the fixed-effects model 
with total revenue (TOTREV) as the dependent variable will be referred to as Model Fixed-2.  
3.2 Discussion of the Variables 
Prior studies on market structure have developed different specifications in order to 
apply the PR methodology to the banking industry. For example, Molyneux et al. (1994) 
and Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) have used the log ratio of interest revenue to total assets 
as the dependent variable, while Shaffer (1982), Nathan and Neave (1989), Vesala (1995), 
Coccorese (1998), and De Band and Davis (2000) have used the logarithm of interest 
revenues for the same purpose.  
In this study two different dependent variables are specified: INTREV as the ratio 
of total interest revenue to total assets in Models (1a) and (2a), and TOTREV as the ratio 
of total (gross) operating revenue to total assets in Models (1b) and (2b). The first 
specification (in which the dependent variable is only the interest part of the total 
revenue) is consistent with the approach that financial intermediation constitutes the core 
business in CEE commercial banking. Although interest revenues still generate the 
principal source of banks’ earnings, recent studies on banking activities report an   18
increasing share of non-interest income from fee-based products and services and off 
balance sheet credit substitutes in total revenues. Given the increased level of competition 
in financial markets, this can be explained partly by the desire of financial services firms 
to expand their revenue generating sources without altering their risk and thus their 
capital structures, materially. For this reason, it will be appropriate to include total 
revenues in the model in addition to interest revenues.  
Other control variables are included in the Model to account for differences in 
bank-specific risk, size, and deposit structure of banks, and they are similar to those 
utilized in previous studies.  The two different risk variables employed are the log ratio of 
equity to total assets (EQTY) and the log ratio of loans to total assets (LOAN).  The size 
variable, log of total assets (TA), is used as a proxy for economies or diseconomies of 
scale, given the wide range of bank asset sizes in the CEE banking systems. The ratio of 
Interbank deposits to customer and short-term funding (IBDP) accounts for differences in 
the deposit mix. 
Loans generally represent the biggest portion of earning assets and also convey 
information about bank’s risk preference. We expect a positive coefficient for the LOAN 
variable since more interest revenue is generated with increasing levels of loans. Equity 
to asset ratio is included to capture the effect of different risk levels among banks, with 
better capitalization ratios indicating lower risk levels. Lower capitalization ratios may 
imply a more aggressive approach in lending with expectation of higher revenues. 
Therefore, the expected sign on the coefficient for capital ratio is negative. The size 
variable (TA) accounts for cost differences related to banks size and also controls for   19
greater portfolio and loan diversification associated with larger banks. An important 
implication of asset diversification is less risk and hence a lower required rate of return. 
We do not know the ex-ante effect of size differentials in assets among banks on revenue 
generating process, and therefore we do not have any  expectation on the sign of the 
coefficient for the size variable. The Interbank deposit ratio (IBDP) variable is included 
in the analysis because interbank deposits imply higher interest costs relative to customer 
deposits and thus constitute a more expensive source of funds than other deposits. We 
expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative.   
3.3 Database and Sample Selection  
In order to be able to perform reliable econometric analyses on bank competition 
the first requirement is to have sufficiently large sample of healthy banks for which 
financial data needed for the model variables are available. The number of banks in 
transition countries is relatively small and the quality of financial reporting for these 
newly established institutions may not be at par. Furthermore, there are always 
discrepancies and inconsistencies in international data, and this is particularly true for the 
transition countries of Europe.  
Annual balance sheet and income statement data for the banks were taken from 
the BankScope database. The banks in the sample comprise a fairly large portion of CEE 
banking industry over the period of 1993-2000.  Since the banks followed and reported 
by BankScope represent a large proportion of banks in each country, this sample 
represents fairly the average bank in the region. The countries included are Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR of Macedonia,   20
Poland, Romania, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Russian Federation, and 
Yugoslavia. We used the consolidated data for a given bank when available, and 
otherwise unconsolidated report.  The initial sample consisted of 2364 observations on 
562 financial institutions.  To be included in the final sample, banks had to be classified 
as commercial banks or cooperative banks in the BankScope data set and they must have 
had all the model variables available for a given year. Bank holding companies, 
investment banks and securities houses, saving banks, real estate and mortgage banks, 
non-banking credit institutions, and other specialized governmental credit institutions are 
excluded from the initial sample to make the data more comparable across countries.  96 
% of the firms in the sample are comprised of commercial banks, and the remaining 4 % 
are cooperative banks. The selection process yielded a unbalanced panel with 2113 
observations belonging to 325 banks over the period 1993-2000. Due to unavailability of 
the data in1993, the starting date in the sample for Yugoslavia and Estonia is 1994. Not 
all the banks were in continuous operation over the entire period due to failures, mergers, 
and de novo entry. Table 4  presents the number of banks in the sample descriptive 
statistics of bank characteristics under study for each country for 1999.  All data are 
reported in US$ as the reference currency and adjusted for inflation. Differences in the 
average bank size are substantial. The average Czech bank has more assets ($2.08 billion 
in 1999) than does the average bank in other CEE countries, followed by Polish and 
Hungarian banks. However, the average Polish bank has generated more loans than the 
average bank in other countries, followed by Czech and Estonian banks.  On average, 
banks in the Czech Republic and Poland have the highest equity capital on their balance 
sheets, followed by Hungarian banks.    21
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Competitive Structure Tests 
  Compared to previous studies on bank competition that generally report cross-
sectional results for a single country, this study  has analyzed the available data in several 
dimensions. The econometric model with 4 different specifications and 2 different 
estimation techniques was run on a pooled data set of the fourteen CEE countries to 
obtain a general picture of the competitive structure of economies in transition over the 
sample period. Table 5 reports the results of these estimations. For the overall  sample,  
models were estimated for three different time horizons-1993-2000, 1993-1996, and 
1997-2000.
14 Panel A of Table 6 lists the results over these three time horizons. In order 
to account for geographical scope of banking services, we also defined two sub-markets 
based on asset size, (large and small banks with total assets above and below the median 
asset size in the sample) and estimated their H-statistics. Estimation results for large and 
small banks are presented in Panel B of Table 6. We also looked at the trend of changes 
in competitive conditions by running the regressions on cross-sectional data for each 
year. These results are reported in Panel C. Finally, we computed the competition index 
for individual countries over the sample period. These estimates are sumarized in Table7.  
4.1.1 Estimation for the Overall Sample  
In this section, the econometric model is applied to a pooled sample of CEE banks 
to evaluate the competitive structure, assuming that banking markets of individual 
                                                 
14 The 1993-1996 period corresponds to the initial years of transition that were characterized by non-
performing loans of state-owned banks and bank failures due mainly to the problems of adjusting to the new 
system and worsened economic conditions. The 1997-2000 period is characterized by the completion of debt 
consolidation, recapitalization of banks, and privatization of major banks along with adoption of restrictive 
monetary policies to stabilize the economic systems and attain positive GDP growth.     22
countries in the region possess comparable characteristics and therefore the region can be 
considered as a single market. Table 5 reports the results of the regression analyses for 
the period 1993-2000. The regression models estimated all had R-squared values of 0.90 
or higher and plausible parameter estimates. 
Although the coefficients on the bank specific factors are of secondary interest to 
competitive analysis, they are reported for the overall sample along with H statistics in 
Table 5.  Note that, the sign on the size coefficient (LNTA) is positive and significant for 
most of the cases, suggesting that size differentials in assets among banks lead to higher 
interest revenues per dollar of assets for the larger banks. In other terms, larger banks 
seem to be more efficient in revenue generating process compared to smaller banks.  The 
positive sign on the coefficient for the loans-to-assets variable (LNLOAN) implies higher 
interest revenue per dollar of assets for banks with a higher proportion of loans on their 
portfolio. This is, of course, consistent with the expectations that higher level of loans 
will generate higher interest income. The risk coefficient, LNEQTY, is also significant 
and has the expected negative sign, indicating that banks with lower proportion of equity 
capital (riskier banks) are able to generate higher income per dollar of their assets. 
Another significant variable with negative coefficient is the deposit mix (IBDP), and it 
suggests that banks, which obtain a higher proportion of their funds from retail (deposit) 
markets, are able to generate higher interest revenues per dollar of their assets compared 
to those banks that rely heavily on interbank funds. This is consistent with the notion that 
higher shares of “core deposits” in total funds imply the degree of retail operations where 
banks confront relatively less competition.    23
The signs on the coefficients for the price of funds proxy (LNPF) and the price of 
labor proxy (LNPL) are always highly statistically significant and positive in all cases, as 
expected.  The price of funds input provides the highest contribution to the explanation of 
bank revenues (thus to H-statistic), followed by the price of labor. The coefficient of 
price of capital proxy is also positive and significant in most of the cases, and provides 
the least contribution to the H-statistic. In general, both models yield similar results and 
the explanatory power of the models is satisfactory. The country dummies also contribute 
significantly to the explanation of dependent variable. 
As for the competitive structure tests, we note the following results. For the OLS 
estimations, models with interest revenue as the dependent variable generally yield higher 
H-statistics. Furthermore, competition coefficients found by fixed-effects estimation 
techniques are relatively lower than those from OLS estimations. For the overall sample 
(Table 5), the mean levels of H values range from 0.46 (Model Fixed-1) to 0.59 (Model- 
1a) depending on the model specification and are significantly different from both zero 
and unity.  This leads to the rejection of the monopoly hypothesis, the conjectural 
variations short-run oligopoly hypothesis, and the hypothesis of perfect competition. Our 
findings indicate that banks in this region have actually operated under monopolistic 
competition between 1993 and 2000, as expected.  
According to Table 6, the estimates of market power coefficient (Model 1a) over 
the two sub-periods, 1993-1996, and 1997-2000 are found to be 0.54 and 0.59 
respectively, and they are statistically significantly different from the bipolar cases of 
unity and zero.  For all models, the estimates for the periods 1993-96 and 1997-2000 
indicate a slight but statistically significant increase in H-values, as expected from the   24
structural economic reforms over the sample period.
15  For individual years, these 
estimates range between 0.41 and 0.70 for Model 1a and between 0.38 and 0.62 for 
Model 1b. They are also statistically significantly different from unity and zero. Similar 
to above conclusions, these results imply that competitive conduct of banks in this region 
cannot be characterized as purely monopolistic or perfectly competitive between 1993 
and 2000.  The cross-section estimates for each year indicate initially a decreasing trend 
between 1993 and 1996 and a subsequent increasing trend in H statistic after 1996, 
although the competitive conduct must still be characterized as monopolistic competition.  
According to both models, the H-statistics for large banks are significantly higher 
than those for smaller banks. Therefore, we can say that large banks in transition 
countries operate in a relatively more competitive environment compared to small banks, 
or, in other words, competition is lower in local markets compared to national and 
international markets. These results are not surprising, since we expect that larger banks 
with international operations would confront higher competitive pressures from other 
Universal European banks.     
Overall, the results are consistent with the expectation that liberalization and 
deregulation of financial markets during the process of transition from command-based to 
market-based systems have increased the competitive conditions in CEE banking 
markets. This conjecture becomes noticeable especially after 1996 when transition 
countries had gone through a substantial privatization, experienced significant foreign 
bank participation in their markets due to a relatively more liberal financial structure, and 
adopted new regulations in order to comply with European banking standards before 
                                                 
15The F statistic for testing the differences in the H-values between the two sub-periods is significant at the 
one percent level, although test results are not explicitly reported to save space.     25
joining the European Union. This is, indeed the period when most of the structural 
reforms in the banking sectors had been fully absorbed and accommodated by the CEE 
countries.  
 
 4.1.2  Estimation for the Individual Countries 
  Observing the structural differences suggested by significant country dummies 
estimated in the full sample analysis also calls for the evaluation of competitive 
conditions at the country level. Table 7 summarizes the calculated market power 
coefficients of the separate analyses for each country over the sample period, under four 
different model specifications. In the majority of cases, the H-statistic is positive and 
significantly different from zero and unity, suggesting that banks operating in an 
environment characterized by monopolistic competition. According to Model (1a), over 
the period 1993-2000, Latvia has the highest competitive index (0.76) and Slovakia has 
the lowest (0.10). At least two models fail to reject the hypothesis H=0 for Slovakia and 
FYR of Macedonia. Therefore, we conclude that for the period 1993-2000 the banking 
markets of Slovakia and FYR of Macedonia can be characterized as monopolistic (or 
conjectural variations short-run oligopoly). 
    According to the above findings, we reject the monopoly and perfect competition 
hypotheses for individual countries (except for FYR of Macedonia and Slovakia) and 
conclude that banks in these countries seem to earn their revenues as if under the 
conditions of monopolistic competition. The results suggest that the highly concentrated 
banking markets of transition economies do not seem to lead to anti-competitive conduct 
as suggested by the traditional SCP hypothesis, since the current analyses consistently   26
reject the existence of collusive behavior. These results seem to be compatible with 
contestable markets theory (CMT), if we can assume that incumbent banks set their 
prices close to the competitive level because of potential competition; otherwise higher 
prices will attract potential entrants with hit-and-run strategies. These results are also 
consistent with the expectation that liberalization and deregulation of CEE financial 
markets have increased the competitive conditions in CEE banking markets.  
 
4.2. Equilibrium Tests  
As noted earlier, the PR approach assumes that banks operate in their long-run 
equilibrium phases, thus implying that their returns should not be statistically correlated 
with input prices. Previous studies tested the accuracy of this assumption by estimating 
the elasticity of bank returns to changes in input prices. For the long-run equilibrium test, 
we follow the extant literature by running the original regression model in Equation (3) 
with return on assets being the new dependent variable. As suggested by Molyneux et al. 
(1994), under this specification a value of H = 0 would indicate an equilibrium in the 
banking markets under investigation.
16    
We perform the long-run equilibrium tests for individual years and sample period 
for the pooled data, and also for individual countries over the sample period.
17  The Wald 
test is used to test the H=0 hypothesis.  The models were estimated using OLS where the 
standard errors were calculated using White’s (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity.
 
The F-statistic for testing hypothesis H=0 indicates that the null hypothesis can only be 
                                                 
16 The direction of bias caused by the disequilibrium in the sample is always toward a spurious appearance 
of market power. In general, if the results indicate a certain form of competitive conduct, we can be 
relatively sure that the monopolistic behavior is not exercised. If the sample does not indicate long-run 
equilibrium, H≤ 0 no longer proves monopoly, but  H>0 still rejects  monopoly or conjectural variation 
short-run oligopoly (Shaffer, 1982, 1983).   
17 We do not report the results of the long-run equilibrium tests to save space but they are available from 
authors upon request.    27
rejected for the year 1997 at any conventional significance levels. The same analyses are 
also performed for individual countries over the sample period. The results rejected the 
existence of equilibrium for Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Slovakia, and the Russian 
Federation at the 5 percent significance level.  Overall, the results reveal the existence of 
long-run equilibrium of the data for the majority of regressions, thus, implying that the 
PR methodology can be used constructively to estimate market contestability.  
 
4.3. Policy Implications  
  In summarizing the specific results of this study, we would also like to make the 
following remarks regarding the policy questions raised in the introductory section. First 
of all, CEE countries deserve to be given special attention and enough credit for their 
achievements in building market-oriented banking systems from almost scratch in such a 
short time period. Despite the considerable disparities among their progress of 
achievement, in less than a decade they have passed the threshold point of  market 
economy that made them  part of the free world--a  progress that took several decades to 
achieve for the developed western countries.  
Broadly speaking, they were rather successful in certain areas of structural 
reforms such as effective design and implementation of the privatization process, 
competitive policies, and prudential regulatory framework. With regard to privatization 
and foreign bank participation, in many of these countries the private sector currently 
holds more than 70 percent of the assets in banking–a figure which is quite comparable to 
that of many western economies--and  more than half of the assets in the CEE banking 
industry are owned by foreign institutions. The results of the current study suggest that 
CEE countries increased their competitiveness with large scale privatization and foreign   28
participation in their banking systems. It is expected that CEE banks will continue to 
respond to increased competition by extending the scope of professional services beyond 
traditional markets, generating other revenue sources by offering new services and 
products, focusing on non-interest income-generating activities, reducing excess capacity 
through mergers and/or branch closures, and upgrading their operations through new 
technology. 
Building strong institutions and effective governance was, and will be, the key 
element throughout the ongoing transition process, which requires market-oriented 
financial structures. Therefore, it is essential to establish a prudentially-regulated entry  
policy and careful supervision for both domestic and foreign participation in managing 
the transition process by avoiding financial distress which is likely to be caused by 
competitive pressures.  Due to the liberal licencing policies, CEE countries experienced a 
rapid growth of new commerical banks during the early  years of transition. Since the 
markets to be served were initially limited, near exponential growth of commercial banks 
caused detrimental effects on banks’ financial positions. As the free market system 
unfolded, the positive  role the foreign banks played became more significant. The entry 
of foreign banks had a  crucial impact on the modernization of domestic banking systems 
through the introduction of modern banking practices, and product and service 
innovation. Regarding the openness and expansion of the banking markets, the results 
suggest that CEE economies  should keep their markets open to well-established foreign 
banks rather than adopting strictly selective policies if they want to seize the maximum 
benefit from best-practices of sound financial institutions and to increase the 
competitiveness and efficiency in their banking markets. Indeed, under the Association   29
Agreements between EU and CEE candidate countries, openness to foreign participation 
is also a necessary condition  to meet the criteria dictated  by the Second Banking 
Directive that enable any EU member bank to operate freely in other member countries’  
banking markets.  
As the empirical results indicate, the CEE economies have brought their “bank-
based” financial systems to the relatively high state of contestability that is somewhat 
comparable to that of the small economies of western Europe. All regulatory reforms and 
restructuring achieved nearly the desired results and made banking more competitive. As 
conditions in CEE markets improve, it is expected that commercial banks will engage in 
non-traditional activities, thus enhancing their non-interest income sources. These 
activities will, in turn, further enhance market contestability.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Our study examines the competitive conditions in fourteen Central and Eastern 
European countries’ banking industry, while explicitly controlling for the bank specific 
factors such as risk, size,  and deposit mix for the period 1993-2000. For the transition 
countries, this period corresponds to an era characterized by substantial reforms to 
restructure their planned economies into market-based economies, and to liberalize and 
deregulate sufficiently their financial systems in order to  integrate economically with the 
advanced western world.  The basis for the evaluation of competitive conditions is the 
extant oligopoly theory in the new industrial organization literature, specifically, the 
competition model developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987).    30
We find that size differentials in assets among CEE banks lead to higher interest 
revenues for the larger banks.  Higher interest revenue per dollar of assets for banks is 
associated with a higher proportion of loans on their portfolio. Results also suggest that 
banks, which obtain a higher proportion of their funds from retail (deposit) markets, are 
able to generate higher interest revenues per dollar of their assets. Finally, riskier banks 
are found to be able to generate higher income per dollar of their assets.  
The results of the competition analysis suggest that the banking markets of CEE 
countries cannot be characterized by the bipolar cases of either perfect competition or 
monopoly over 1993-2000 except for FYR of Macedonia and Slovakia.  That is, banks 
earned their revenues as if operating under conditions of monopolistic competition in that 
period. Overall, large banks in transition countries operate in a relatively more 
competitive environment compared to small banks, or in other words, competition is 
lower in local markets compared to national and international markets. Finally, the cross-
sectional analysis of competitive structure shows initially a decreasing trend between 
1993 and 1996 and a subsequent increasing trend in competitive conditions after 1996, 
revealing the inevitable impact of liberalization on competitive conditions.  As an overall 
conclusion, for the region and individual countries under investigation, the banking 
market structure can be characterized as monopolistic competition. This conclusion holds 
under a variety of specifications controlling for bank-size, risk and various deposit 
composition characteristics, and a number of estimation techniques.  
Our findings are consistent with previous research on bank competition that 
generally report varying degrees of monopolistic competition.  The results do not support 
the notion that high concentration in CEE banking markets will result in monopoly rents   31
as suggested by SCP hypothesis. These results seem to be compatible with contestable 
markets theory, if one can assume that incumbent firms set their prices close to the 
competitive level because of potential competition; otherwise higher prices will attract 
potential entrants with hit-and-run strategies. However, we should also note that the 
period under investigation corresponds to early years of the ongoing transition from 
central planning when these countries were lacking many market-supportive institutions 
essential for efficient financial markets. Therefore, the results of this study should be 
interpreted with the necessary scholarly scrutiny. 
The growth of research and knowledge about the process of political, social, and 
economic transition from command economies to market economies has been substantial 
over the recent years. We believe that this infant area will continue to receive a great deal 
of attention, particularly because a number of interesting questions have been suggested 
by the examination of competitive structure. It will be interesting for future research to 
inquire: How did banks react to the European unification in anticipation of increased 
competition? Which banking activities in the region are likely to be affected because of 
the EMU? What organizational rearrangement banks have experienced in response to 
changing competitive conditions? Have there been significant efficiency gains derived 
from increased competition?
18 If yes, are these efficiency gains passed onto bank 
customers as reduced costs or improved product and service quality? These are some of 
the interesting questions on banking in transtion countries to be answered by future 
research.  
 
                                                 
18 In a companion paper, the authors have addressed this question and found encouraging results.  See 
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  Table 1    Interpretation of H statistic 
Estimated H  Competitive environment test  
H ≤ 0  Monopoly  or Conjectural variations short-run oligopoly 
0<H<1 Monopolistic  competition 
H=1 
Perfect competition 
Natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable market 




Table  2  Summary of Literature on Measuring Bank Competition Using P-R Methodology 
Authors Period  Countries  Examined  Results 
Nathan and Neave (1989)  1982-1984  Canada  Monopolistic Competition  
Shaffer (1982)  1979  New York  Monopolistic competition 
Molyneux et al. (1994)  1986-1989  France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, United Kingdom 
Monopoly for Italy 
Monopolistic competition for France, Germany, 
Spain, UK 
Vesala (1995)  1985-1992  Finland  Monopolistic competition for all but two years 
Molyneux et al (1996)  1986-1988  Japan  Monopoly for 1986 
Monopolistic competition for 1988 
Coccorese (1998)  1988-1996  Italy  Monopolistic competition 
De Bandt and Davis(1999)  1992-1996  France, Germany, Italy 
Large banks: monopolistic competition in all 
countries; 
Small banks: monopolistic competition in Italy, 
monopoly in France and Germany 
Hondroyiannis et al. (1999)   1993-95  Greece  Monopolistic competition 
Bikker and Groeneveld (2000)  1989-1996  15 EU countries  Monopolistic competition 
Bikker and Haaf (2002)  1988-1998  23 Industrialized 
countries 
Whole sample: Monopolistic competition 
Large banks: Monopolistic competition in general, 
several exceptions of perfect competition  






















Table 3   Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables  
(Variables other than ratios are in 1000s of US Dollars) 
Variable Name  Specification    Mean   Std. Dev   Min   Max  
Interest Revenue (INTREV)  Ratio of total interest revenue to 
total assets  0.13  0.10  0.0031  0.95 
Total Revenue (TOTREV)    Ratio of total operating revenue to 
total assets  0.19  0.19  0.000  1.94 
Price of Funds (PF)  Ratio of interest expenses to 
deposits and other liabilities   0.10  0.11  0.0002  0.92 
Price of labor (PL)  Ratio of personnel expenses to total 
assets  0.02  0.02  0.0003  0.27 
Price of physical capital  (PK)  Ratio of non-interest expenses to 
fixed assets  0.05  0.13  0.0000  2.24 
Total Assets (TA)  Total assets  836780  1954800  71.8100  19554211 
Fixed Assets (FA)  Fixed assets  34107.88  89327.36  1.0000  1699595 
Equity (EQTY)  Ratio of equity capital to total assets 0.16  0.15  0.000  0.95 
Deposit Mix (IBDP)  Ratio of interbank deposits to 
customer and short-term funding  0.27  0.26  0  1 
Loans (LOAN)  Ratio of net loans to total assets  0.41  0.18  0  1   36 
 
 
Table 4   Descriptive Statistics of Banks in Sample by Country Average for 1999 
Country  N 
Assets   Deposits   Other 
funding  
Equity   Loans  Investment 
securities 
Czech Rep.  23  2080406.6 1624421.6 133993.74 181037.25 824995.62  1022069.07
Estonia  4  853797.76 596246.13 77872.34 117707.83 497291.66  247507.28
Croatia  35  371027.14 239724.81 47188.73 55213.97 197176.16  165395.22
Hungary  30  955514.74 747333.03 47471.45 82570.47 407301.88  458503.72
Lithuania  9  283078.5 233102.49 8186.64 29750.64 146475.77  71032.55
Latvia  20  153242.88 132194.78 1500.94 14950.45 69846.75  62257.78
FYR of Macedonia  10  97645.31 63878.15 496.53 16536.54 41953.39  47531.04
Poland  43  1912469.2 1630925.3 7222.85 172547.94 967080.4  779226.86
Romania   27  318874 252160.32 3128.1 48889.57 97394.2  170034.02
Russian Federation  80  535235.56 378220.24 14861.45 69694.85 228825.34  226358.92
Slovenia  20  687551.78 560575.39 24718.57 70852.66 377501.9  274026.27
Slovakia  18  846286.35 738380.42 11147.26 46441.51 484277.61  356381.25
All quantity variables are in thousands of US dollars and corrected for inflation. 
Total number of banks N = 319 for 1999.    37 
 
Table 5  Regression Results of Competitive Conditions for CEE banks: Panel data covering the period  1993-2000                       
  
Model 
1a  (INTR)     
Model 




Coeff.         t 
Est. 
Coeff.       t  Est. Coeff.      t 
Est. 
Coeff.         t 
Est. 
Coeff.       t 
Est. 
Coeff.       t    
PF  0.3515  27.5  ***  0.2671  22.99 ***  0.4093  37.66 ***  0.3291  31.63  ***  0.2731  23  ***  0.2958  17.54  *** 
PL  0.2038  14.6  ***  0.1459  10.60 ***                   0.1584  7.11  ***  0.1769  8.23  *** 
PK  ( or PO)  0.0301  3.42  ***  0.0785  7.48 ***  0.1465  3.45 ***  0.2184  9.31  ***  0.0323  2.61  ***  0.0231  1.12    
LNTA  0.015  1.9  *  0.018  2.23 **  0.0122  1.55 **  0.045  5.59  ***  0.0204  0.78     0.086  3.25  *** 
LNEQTY   -0.07  -4.66  ***  -0.055  -3.14 ***  -0.055  -3.6 ***  -0.0267  -1.72  *  -0.0111  -0.45     -0.033  -1.91  * 
LNLOAN  0.1547  12.3  ***  0.1212  10.54 ***  0.1543  11.82 ***  0.1118  8.41  ***  0.1389  8.17  ***  0.1542  9.35  *** 
LNIBDP  -0.0097  -2.05  **  -0.0076  -2.02 **  -0.0122  -2.67 ***  -0.0127  -2.62  ***  -0.0153  -2.46  **  -0.0137  -2.56  ** 
Czech Republic  -0.8958  -7.83  ***  -1.0568  -9.32 ***  -1.2318  -11.7 ***  -0.6244  -5.8  ***                   
Estonia  -1.064  -9.26  ***  -1.225  -12.68 ***  -1.1673  -10.2 ***  -0.5103  -4.37  ***                   
Croatia  -0.9762  -9.69  ***  -1.3564  -13.28 ***  -1.1309  -11.9 ***  -0.5097  -5.24  ***                   
Hungary  -0.8612  -7.94  ***  -1.5687  -9.65 ***  -1.0927  -10.8 ***  -0.5485  -5.3  ***                   
Lithuania  -1.2261  -11.2  ***  -1.2788  -12.51 ***  -1.3246  -12.1 ***  -0.6181  -5.56  ***                   
Latvia  -0.942  -9.14  ***  -1.6542  -15.58 ***  -1.1036  -11.2 ***  -0.4058  -4.05  ***                   
Macedonia  -0.7026  -6.49  ***  -0.9244  -9.36 ***  -0.8932  -8.53 ***  0.1018  0.96                      
Poland  -0.7139  -6.69  ***  -0.9649  -8.35 ***  -0.9195  -9.22 ***  -0.2948  -2.9  ***                   
Romania   -0.3511  -3.37  ***  -0.5325  -5.12 ***  -0.5987  -5.96 ***  -0.0652  -0.64                      
Russia  -0.7304  -7.31  ***  -0.8951  -8.36 ***  -1.0235  -11 ***  -0.258  -2.71  ***                   
Slovenia  -1.0369  -9.52  ***  -1.2547  -11 ***  -1.2355  -12 ***  -0.623  -5.93  ***                   
Slovakia  -0.9814  -8.66  ***  -1.3622  -11.36 ***  -1.3131  -12.5 ***  -0.7231  -6.76  ***                   
Yugoslavia                    -1.218  -10.6 ***  -0.3056  -2.61  ***                   
Bulgaria                    -1.0625  -10.6 ***  -0.2153  -2.1  **                   
H - Statistic  0.59  (0.02)      0.49  (0.03)      0.56  (0.02)      0.55  (0.04)      0.46  (0.08)      0.50  (0.07)     
1F-value  for H=0  758.31***      687.77***      1010.5***      945.85 ***      319.45  ***      388.44  ***     
2F-value  for H=1  570.05***      883.26***      1843.09***      1818.5 ***      426.3  ***      457.11  ***     
Adjusted R2  0.97        0.96        0.96        0.95        0.98        0.98       
# of observations  1769        1764        2113        2105        1369        1362       
                                                        
 
Estimated regression model:   ln (REVit) = h1 ln(PFit)+h2 ln(PLit)+h3 ln(PKit)+β1 ln(TAit)+β2 ln(EQTYit)+β3 ln(LOANit)+β4 ln(IBDPit)+Σl=1 αl Dl +εit    
for t=1,…..,T where T is the number of periods observed, and i=1,….. ,I, where I is the total number of banks and ln is the natural logarithm.  The dependent variable is the logarithm of the 
total interest revenue (or total operating revenue) scaled by total assets. Variables PF, PL and PK are the unit prices of three inputs: funds, labor, and physical capital. Bank specific factors are 
total assets (TA), financial capital (EQTY), loans to total assets (LOAN), and interbank deposits to total assets (IBDP).  Country dummies are also  included in the model. The model is 
estimated by running Least-squares regressions (except for Fixed-effects models) on the pooled sample of fourteen CEE countries. The models are adjusted to correct for first order serial 
correlation. The standard errors were calculated using White’s (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity. T-statistics are given in italics next to the parameter estimates. The H statistic is equal 
to the sum of the elasticities of the interest revenue with respect to three input prices: H =  h1 + h2 + h3 . Standard errors are reported in  parentheses. The Wald test is used to test the H=0 and 
H=1 hypothesis. 
1F statistic for testing hypothesis H=0.  
2F statistic for testing hypothesis H=1.  ***,**, and * indicate 1,5 , and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.  
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Table 6   H Statistics for Years and Size Groups 
      Model 1a  (INTREV)     Model 1b  (TOTREV)  Model 2a  (INTREV)     Model 2b  (INTREV)
     H  # of Obs.    H  # of Obs.    H  # of Obs.     H  # of Obs. 
Panel A                                    
1993-2000     0.59  1769    0.49  1764    0.56  2113     0.60  2105 
                                    
1993-1996     0.54  741    0.45  732    0.52  909     0.51  905 
                                    
1997-2000     0.59  1028    0.49  1032    0.55  1204     0.69  1200 
                                    
Panel B                                   
Large Banks  0.72  907    0.60  903    0.71  1056     0.76  1050 
                                    
Small Banks  0.56  862    0.52  861    0.46  1057     0.52  1055 
                                    
Panel C                                   
1993     0.65  110    0.62  98    0.69  122     0.74  120 
                                    
1994     0.50  161    0.60  187    0.61  185     0.62  185 
                                    
1995     0.44  220    0.38  215    0.46  268     0.45  266 
                                    
1996     0.41  250    0.32  248    0.36  294     0.43  293 
                                    
1997     0.54  285    0.40  272    0.53  337     0.56  332 
                                    
1998     0.70  252    0.46  245    0.62  303     0.60  305 
                                    
1999     0.55  273    0.58  276    0.55  332     0.69  330 
                                    
2000     0.57  218    0.50  223    0.59  272     0.81  274 
See table 5 for the definition of estimated regression models.   
Large and small banks are determined by total assets above and below the median asset size in the sample. 
The Wald test is used to test the H=0 and H=1 hypothesis. Both hypotheses were rejected at the 5 percent level for all 







Table 7   H-Statistic for Individual Countries (1993-2000)  
   Model -1a     Model - 1b     Model -2a     Model-2b  
Country   H  # of Obs.     H  # of Obs.      H  # of Obs.     H  # of Obs.  
The Czech Rep.  0.52   160  0.43  160  0.39  165  0.35  165 
Estonia  0.70  27  0.34  27  0.59  28  0.31  28 
Croatia  0.74  235  0.70  235  0.69  236  0.64  236 
Hungary  0.36  132  0.41  132  0.43  164  0.43  164 
Lithuania  0.44  31  0.37  31  0.36  36  0.52  36 
Latvia  0.76  104  0.62  103  0.52  112  0.48  110 
FYR of Macedonia  0.18
MP  34  0.39
MP  34  0.43  33  0.25
MP  33 
Poland  0.51  243  0.50  243  0.41  261  0.41  261 
Romania  0.54  66  0.52  66  0.9  56  0.59  82 
The Russian Fed.  0.64  361  0.56  357  0.75  412  0.71  410 
Slovenia  0.58  96  0.53  96  0.47  116  0.55  116 
Slovakia  0.10
MP  88  0.64  88  0.19
MP  97  0.36  97 
Yugoslavia          0.70  56  0.67  59 
Bulgaria          0.59  103  0.60  102 
The Wald test is used to test H= 0 and H=1 hypotheses.  
MP Means can not reject the hypothesis H=0 (Monopoly) at the 5% significance level.  